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CAPITAL STRUCTURE:
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
Lawrence Mclean and Roberr J. Angell
''Holl' do firms choose their capital structures? . .. the answer

is. ·we don't know.' "

S. Myers

Introduction

In a world of perfect information. the capital ~tructure decision would be a
rather ~imple one. However. even in a world where information nows rapidly
to large numbers of investors. there are ~ignificant numbers of market imperfections or frictions which cause the decision to be much more complex than we
would desire. In fact. despite more than twenty-five years of research directed
at the leverage-valuation question. a generally-accepted theory of corporate capital
structure has not been developed.
Early capital structure investigations. cast m the Modigliani and Miller (M&M)
framework. sought to demonstrate and extend the conclusion of capital structure
irrelevance. Subsequent approaches (Chen and Kim [6] provide a concise summary) have argued for an optimum debt level for the firm from two distinct standpoints - bankruptcy and agency cosb.' A recent approach by Myers and Majluf
suggests a ··pecking order" explanation of capital structure. The purpose ofth1s
paper is to evaluate empirically these three explanations of corporate capital
~tructure.
O ptimal Capital St ructure Approaches
Ba nkruptcy-based O ptimal Capital Structure

The desirability of the use of debt financing. derived from the tax benefits of
interest deductibility. wa~ originally discussed by Modigliani and Miller (141[ 15].
Negative aspects of debt arising from positive bankruptcy costs made more probable as debt increased have been discussed by many authors (Baxter (3J, Brennan and Schwartz [5]. Chen and Kim [6]. Hirshleifer [8]. Kim I 10]. Kraus and
Litzenberger [11). Robicheck and Myers [19]. and Scott [20]). Combining the
positive and negative aspects of debt into the same model. Kraus and Litzenberger
[ 111 and Kim [ 10) developed an optimal capital mucture. Essentially. for a given
level of operating earnings, a firm maximizes its market value by using debt up
to the point where the marginal cost due to increased bankruptcy risk is exactly
offset by the marginal benefit arising from the tax subsidy of the interest expense
deductibility. Key factors in the determination of the amount of debt to use are
the distribution of operating earnings, the level of bankruptcy costs and the corporate tax rate.
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I Agency-based Optimal Capital Structure
( Agency theory has been used to develop insight into the capital ~t~u~ture puz-
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zle as well as other financial policy issue~. Jensen and Meckhng [9] 1mt1ated the
investigation of agency problems in owner-managed firms. The unique po~ition
of the owner-manager enables him to exploit out~kk owners via excessive salarie~.
perquisites. etc. The outside owners realize that this can happen and will_incur
costs to control or prevent their exploitation by the manager~. Because the incentive to exploit outside owners is directly related to the propomon of investment
provided in the form of external equity. tbe !-Ubstitution of debt for external equity
reduces the owner-manager's incentive to exploit the external owners. Thus. the
use of debt, according to Jensen and Meck.I ing. provides another mcam of reducing
the agency costs of equity. However. debt i, not "free .. and ha, it, own agenc)
costs. These agency costs include bankruptcy co~b and the exploitation of bondholders by shareholders. Exploitation or bondholder\ by shareholder, can ari~e
from the shareholders· incentive to increase the ri~kincss of the firm and force
the bondholder to , hare in that ri,k. This risk increase es~ntiall::,, involves a wealth
transfer to the shareholder from the bondholder. Another lorm of exploitation
involves the investment decision . Shareholders have an incentive to inc rease the
riskiness of the firm. even at the cxpen\e of foregoing certain profitable investments (Myers [16)) and undertaking other inve,tment, '-A. ith inadequate return, .
Jensen and Meckhng argue that the value of the firm is maximized when total
agency costs are minimized In the case of the capital structure decision. thc.i,
state that the optimal capital \tructurc will occur at the debt level where the
marginal reduction in agency costs with equity i~ exactly offset by tbe marginal
agency costs of debt.
Ahmihud and Lev [2] and McLean [ 12) ha\e addressed the agency problem
between shareholders and manager, vb a , is the capital ,tructure decision. These
approaches argue that manager equity ownership. generally thought to be a method
of reducing agency problems. exacerbate\ the agency problem regarding the capital
structure decision . Essentially . manager\ have significant portions of their wealth
lied up in their firms. This wealth consists of the capitahzed ,tream of expected
future compensation and any equity (common stock or option, on common stock).
Such wealth is non-diversifiable and creates a portfolio imbalance for the manager
as compared to a fully diver,1fied shareholder. Thi, portfolio imbalance imposes
a higher risk on the manager for a given fi rm-related deci~ion. 1 A manager faced
with this ,ituat1on will choose less financial risl. (Jes~ leverage) than 7111ght be
considered optimal by a divers,fi.::d ,harcholder.

The " Pecking-Order " Explana tion of C apit al Structure
The "pecking-order" approach recently proposed by Myers and MaJlu f [ l 8[
suggests an order of capital preference on the part of management. According
to Myers and Majlu f, firms first prefer internal to external financing. When internal funds (cash flow or draw-down of marketable securities) arc insufficient.
debt financing is the next preferred source. When debt financing is e xhausted
or prohibitively expensive, the firm then appears to prefer hybrid securities .
Equ11y financing is used only as a last resort.
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--------Myers and Majluf [ 18] demonstrate that. under the assumption of assymetrical
infonnation, the "pecking order" approach can be shown to be rational behavior
for managers maximizing wealth for existing shareholders. The logic underlying
the "pecking order" approach is based on the rationality of the managers of the
firm and the investors in financial market5. Myers and Majluf suggest that if the
manager possesses special infonnation indicating that the ''intrinsic" value of
the existing shares is less than the current price (i.e., equity is overvalued), issuing equity at the current price, even to finance les5 than zero-NPV projects, can
be justified. If shares were to be issued at thi~ ·'inflated·· price, the average "intrinsic" value of the shares would be raised. Any subsequent decline, which occurs once the market acquire5 the manager·~ special information and adjusts the
market price to the lower justified level. would be spread over more shares. This
would dilute the price decline for the existing 5hareholder5. On the other hand.
if the manager were to have private information which indicates the "true" value
of the shares were greater than the market price. he could even pass up positiveNPV projects rather than share the future market price increase with new
shareholders.
Given the above scenario. issuance of new shares would thu~ be a signal to
the financial markets that managers pos~ess ~pecific information which indicates
that the current price of the stock is too high . Investor~. understanding the pro·
cess. would then immediately adjust the market price of the stock down or even
refuse to purchase any new shares unle5s the firm had already exhausted its debt
capacity. This action by investors would thus effectively force the firm to follow
the "pecking order" approach.

Empirical Test
Data and Model
A sample of 408 firms was randomly selected from the COMPUSTAT tapes.
Unavailability of data reduced the sample to 353 firms. Compustat was the ~ource
of all data except for the owner~hip data which were obtained from copies of
1980 company proxy repo11s.
The following cross-sectional regression model wa~ u~ed:
L = b
+ b OWN + b OPVAR + b GROWTH + e [I]

0

2

where the variable~ are defined :is follows:
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Leverage (L): the percentage represented by the average of longterm debt divided by the total as~et~ for the I 979- 1981 period.
Ownership (OWN ): the percentage of ,;insider ownership" - the
percentage of total stock outstanding owned by all officers and directors as a group. as repo11ed in the 1980 proxy repo11s.
Operating Variability (OPVAR): the standard deviation of
operating cash flows divided by total assets - The standard deviation of operating cash flows (repo11ed operating income increased by

adding back depreciation) was calculated for_ each company and then
divided by the total assets of that company
I 981 . N meteen _years
(1963-1981) of operating cash flow~. 1f available. were u~ed in the
calculation . Companies which had fewer than nineteen year5 w~re
included if they had a minimum often years (1972- 1981). Companie~
with fewer than 10 years of data on file were excluded from the

m

sample.
Growth (GROWTH): one plu~ the growth rate of a~\eb - The
average total as~ets for the three-year period 1979-198 I were divided
by the average total asset~ for the three-year periori 1972- 1974.
Other (b and e): the intercept and error term 0.
Variable Choice and Hy potheses
Variability of operating earnings i~ used a~ a proxy for the cla~~1cal tax-benefitbankruptcy-cost trade-off rationalization of capital ~tructure.' According to thi~
optimal capital structure approach (Krau~ and Litzenberger I10]. Kim {9]). for
a given tax rate and bankruptcy penalty, leverage will be inver~ely related to
operating risk. Since variability of operating earning~ b a measure of operating
risk, we hypothe~ize that leverage is inver~ely related to operating variability.
The manager owner..hip variable is included as a proxy for the agency approach
to capital structure determination. The greater the manager·~ owner~hip in h1~
firm, the le~s diversified i~ h1~ total wealth. 4 Becau~e of an inability to adequate I)
diversify, he will prefer le~~ financial rbk (!es~ leverage) than 5hareholder~.
Following thi~ logic. we hypothesize that leverage i~ inversely related to m~ider
ownership.
The growth variable repre,ent~ a prox) variable for the "pecking order" approach. Because firms will u~e debt whenever they require (and It i~ available)
external financing. debt as a pe rcentage of the capital ~tructure \hould be higher
for firms that use large amounts of external financing ver~u, 1ho~e firms that use
external financing bs frequently. Because rapidly growing firms generally require more capital than slower growing or stallc firms. the "pecking order" approach would indicate that the amount of firm leverage would be tied to as\et
growth . Thus, our third hypothesis is that leverage i~ positively related to asset
growth.

Results
'.able I presents summary statistics of the sample Leverage averaged 22. 7 %;
insiders controlled 14.5% of the outstanding shares of common stock; and growth
m assets averaged 134.3 % for the entire period measured .
(

SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR TOTAL SAMPLE
( IN PERCENT l

----------------------------------------------------------

VARIABLE

MEAN

LEVERAGE

22.7

OWNERSHIP

1'1. 5

OPVAR

11. 2

GROWTH

2.34

STD. DEV.

MIN. VALUE

MAX. VALUE

o.o

81.0

15. S

o.o

82.4

b.S

I. 7

44.7

I. 4 9

0.23

10.99

'"· 3

The regression results arc presented in Table II. All three hypotheses are supported by the te5t results and all coefficients are significant at the I % level.
TAElL!', 1!
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TOTAL SAMPLE
VARIABLE

COEFFICIENT

STD. ERROR

PR>T

27.040

1.b53

.0001

OWN

- o. 1 75

0 .04b

.0002

OPVAR

- o. 721

0.13b

.0001

2.bb3

0 .590

.0001

INTERCEPT

GROWTH

2
R

=

0.118

---------------------------------------------------------------Approximately 14 % of the firms (48 firms) in the sample reported book losses
during the 1977-1981 time period. Because losses may reduce a firm's shontcrm ability to achieve a target capital structure. the regression was run for 1he
subsample of 305 firms which did not incur losses in 1977-1981 time period.
Results are shown in Table Ill .

Hl!!b!; !!!
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PROFITABLE FIRMS
( 305 COMPANIES>

------------------------------------- VARIABLE

2b.29b

1.69b

.0001

OWN

- 0.222

0.051

.0001

OPVAR

- 0.807

0.145

.0001

3.274

0.604

.0001

INTERCEPT

!

I

I

f

PR>T

STO. ERROR

COEFFICIENT

GROWlH

R

2

0.170

--------------------------------------------------------------

The results in both the full and ~ub~ample tesb suggest that all three competing
approaches to capital Mructure have empirical merit. Although all coefficients
~ere statistically significant, their importance in the determination of leverage
(i.e .• their economic significance) differed . For the total ~ample. the contribution of each variable. expressed in percentage points of leverage. is summarized
in Table IV. The intercept term is by far the largest contributor to average leverage.
followed in artier by operating variability . growth and ownership.

LEVERAGE COMPONENTS OF THE AVERAGE FIRM
IN PERCENTAGE POINTS

TOl'AL SAMPLE

----------------------------------------------------LEVERAGE
INTERCEPT

22.bB'Y.

27.04'Y.

OWN

2.54'Y.

OPVAR

- 8.081.

GROWTH

+

6.

261.

---------------------------------------------------------------

The ~ize of the intercept term is consistent with either the original Modigliani
and Miller position of leverage irrelevance or model misspecification resulting
from omitted variables . The fact that the net effect on OWN. OPVAR. and
GROWTH explain almost 20% of the mean leverage figure. however, is not con-
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sistent with M&M leverage irrelevance. That this is a net effect is even more
detrimental to the irrelevance position. Both OPY AR and GROWTH variables
contribute (opposite) effects equaling 36% and 28 % • respectively. of the mean
leverage of the companies in the sample.

Summary
In this article we have attempted to evaluate several theories which purpon
to explain. at least in part. the capital structure puzzle. The bankruptcy. agency
and pecking-order approaches were evaluated in a single empirical test. Results
provide some support for each of the explanations. It is obvious that the proxies
used for the three approaches are not perfect. Furthermore. it is also obvious
that there are factors. other than those in the model. which enter into the capital
structure decision . However. the results of this paper support the position that
leverage is affected by the three proxies selected.
While the question ... How <lo firms choo~e their capital structure?'' cannot
be answered. it appears as though the three approaches all have some merit and
that some of the significant variables in the complex puzzle have been identified.
Footnotes
Although agreement is not universal regarding the validity of the optimal
capital structure conclusions (see. for example. Miller [ 13) and Senbet and Tag•
gart [21 I). this approach continues to be an important research thrust in the at·
tempt to reconcile the Modigliani and Miller model with observed capital
structures.
1

There is some difference between the stoc kholders· and managers· points of
view on the question of risk. If the corporation undertakes a risky new venture.
the stockholders may not he very concerned. because they can balance this new
risk against other risks that they hold in their portfolio~. The managers. however.
do not have a portfolio of employers. If the corporation does badly because the
new venture fails. they do not have any rish C)(CCpt the others taken by the same
corporation to balance again~t it. They are hurt by a failure more than the
stockholders, who hold ~tock in other corporations a~ well (Treynor and Black
[23]).
2

3 Exclusion of corporate tax rates and bankruptcy co~b from the empirical model
is equivalent to assuming that cros~-seetional differences in these variables are
small enough to ignore.

• The choice of the ownership statistic presents an i~~ue not addressed in this
anicle. Because the process of management involve~ an interaction and dependence
among managers, even the "peak coordinator" cannot act in a completely in·
dependent manner. This lead manager must work with and through his superiors
(the Board of Directors) and his subordinates. Alchian ·s [ 11 notion of internal
discipline arising from the competition among managers is the basi~ for using
insider ownership rather than merely ownership of the chief executive officer·
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